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Abstract 
Tis paper introduces the notion of ‘phenomenography’. Phenomenography is an 
ethnographic research practice that attempts to combine practice-theoretical approaches 
(praxiography) to investigations of human-environment-technology relations with 
phenomenological perspectives on knowing and experiencing these relations. It is rooted 
within relational anthropology (Beck, 2008). Te paper introduces a set of basic premises 
guiding phenomenography before relating four short empirical sequences, the analyses of 
which suggest specifc analytical sensitivities: mind, brain and body in social interaction; 
knowledge and experience in psychiatric treatment; reproductive technologies in shaping 
sociality and kinship; (digital) infrastructures’ impact on ways of being-in-the-world.
Te paper concludes by defning phenomenography as a co-laborative research practice that 
aims to curate concepts jointly with research partners and that aims to provide a new form 
of refexivity within anthropology. 
Keywords: phenomenography, relational, practice theory, modes of being-in-the-world 
Introducing Phenomenography 
Te study of ‘humankind in all its aspects’ is a difcult task. Ongoing debates within 
the American Anthropological Association about its statement of purpose, from which 
this phrase is taken, point to the many fault lines that run through anthropological 
terrain and that obstruct the passage to unifying approaches (most prominently perhaps 
Scheper-Hughes, 1995, and the ensuing debate): the separation of nature and culture 
the deepest and most suspiciously guarded among them. Yet it has also been pointed 
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out that straightforward questions such as ‘How do people live in groups?’ are asked 
of anthropologists – biological and social/cultural alike – and that it is of little use to 
pretend that these are somehow not legitimate questions (Kuper and Marks, 2011). 
Productive answers to these questions can neither take holistic form nor can they insist 
on the primacy of any singular epistemology or ontologically primitive analytical unit. 
Tey need to navigate and speak to diferent thought styles, scientifc practices and 
research felds. Answers will necessarily fall short of comprehensiveness and are likely to 
encounter strong resistance from many sides. It takes humble anthropological engines 
of discovery (Hacking, 2006) to fnd answers that are good to think with (Strathern, 
2002). 
Tis paper develops the notion of phenomenography as a contribution to such 
engines. Te paper does not list Stefan Beck as a co-author, because it has been written 
after his death. Yet his thinking, his critical questioning, his relentless scepticism and his 
wit have shaped every sentence. So the ‘we’ in this paper refers to the authors and always 
includes Stefan Beck. And it is only ftting that we start our line of argument from one 
of his key concerns: phenopraxis, the constitution in practice of being-in-the-world.
It marks an entry point into investigating how processes of social ordering unfold, i.e. 
how people live in groups within specifc environments. And it is an attempt to bring 
into productive dialogue practice theoretical thinking and science and technology 
studies with phenomenological questions, all against the backdrop of a keen interest in 
materiality in action. 
Stefan Beck never used the term phenomenography. Even the notion of phenopraxis 
(Phänopraxie in German) has not been published, but was only pondered within work-
in-progress lab sessions in Berlin. Yet rather than reviewing what has been, we try to 
carry his thinking forward. By phenomenography we thus mean the ethnographic 
study of phenopraxis. Perhaps pheno-praxiography would be the more accurate term 
as it retains praxiography as the more established ethnographic study of socio-material 
practices (Mol, 2002). Yet we take our cue from ethnomethodologist Michael Lynch, 
who responded to the recent debates in science and technology studies about the 
ontological turn by arguing that rather than presupposing multiple ontologies, scholars 
should be concerned with studying how such onto-logies are produced. He referred to 
this approach as ‘ontography’ (Lynch, 2013). We much appreciate the humble ‘graphein’ 
in the face of the daunting ‘logos’. Analogously, we suggest phenomenography as the 
practice theoretical investigation into phenomena as they are being enacted, i.e. into 
modes of being-in-the-world. 
We proceed to fesh out the notion of phenomenography in two steps. First, we 
briefy outline four basic premises of phenomenographic research. Second, we proceed 
in the main section of the paper to present four facets of phenomenographic concern 
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rooted within empirical material taken from recent and current projects conducted 
within our group and with Stefan Beck. 
1. Tought Styles 
‘What actually thinks within a person is not the individual himself but his social 
community. Te source of his thinking is not within himself but is to be found in his social 
environment and in the very social atmosphere he ‘breathes.’ His mind is structured, 
and necessarily so, under the infuence of this ever-present social environment, and he 
cannot think in any other way.’ (Fleck, 1935/1979, p. 47f.) 
Tis quote from the Polish physician and immunobiologist Ludwik Fleck decentres 
the individual subject as the origin of knowledge and the production of truth claims. 
Instead Fleck suggests that we think of knowledge production as a social process; one 
where individual thinking is constrained by a social collective trained in conducting lab 
work in a specifc way, joined by a shared language, shared concepts and shared paths 
of argument and thought. Phenomenographic research rests on this understanding of 
scientifc practice as enacted within collective thought styles. 
2. Practice and Relations 
Phenomenography is part of a relational anthropology (Beck, 2008). Relational 
anthropology focuses on the practices – epistemic and otherwise – within which nature 
and culture are hybridised in continuously changing confgurations of sociality. Its basic 
unit of analysis are ‘relations between relations’ in practice (Beck, 2008, p. 197). It is 
a symmetrical form of organised scepticism: symmetrical in the sense that it doubts 
any simple methodical or epistemic reductionisms within the natural sciences, while at 
the same time asking the social and cultural sciences to re-engage with materiality and 
letting go of the notion of biology as the enemy of critical thought. (Tsing, 2000) 
3. Reassembling the Social 
Phenomenography does not centre on the self-evident individual of idealist philosophy, 
but rather concerns itself with always already partially connected ‘dividuals’ (Strathern, 
1988) or thoroughly ‘socialised’ forms of practice within which individuality may 
be enacted. Yet while we endorse a Durkheimian understanding of sociality as a unit 
of analysis sui generis (Beck, 2013b), we also appreciate research in the science and 
technology studies and feminist critique over the last 20 years that has reassembled 
‘the social’ as continuously co-produced from the entanglement of human and non-
human agencies (Latour, 2005). Bodies, material artefacts, technologies and material 
environments are important sources of agency. 
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4. Ecologies of Expertise in the Contemporary 
While heavily infused with thinking from science and technology studies, 
phenomenography is not about understanding the production of knowledge and truth 
claims for their own sake. Rather knowledge practices or ecologies of expertise are a 
central element of processes of social ordering and how knowledge and experience change 
modes of being-in-the-world and modes of being-done-in-the-world (Beck, 2012; Beck, 
Niewöhner et al., 2012). Very much in line with an anthropology of the contemporary 
(Rabinow, 2004; Rabinow, Marcus et al., 2008), the human and technical sciences, 
understood as forms of practice, play a central role in shaping the concrete sets of 
practices within which ‘humankind in all its aspects’ is being done. Phenomenography 
is thus a research practice aimed at producing refexivity within the epistemic, social and 
material architectures of late modernities (Law, 1994; Boyer, 2015). 
Te following sections portray research from four very diferent contexts within 
which Stefan Beck was centrally involved. We present them here to illustrate four 
important facets of phenomenographic concern: the role of cognition and the 
brain in social practices, the role of knowledge and experience in shaping (disease) 
classifcations, the role of technology in reconfguring kinship and sociality, and the role 
of digital infrastructures in mediating social practices. Tis is, of course, by no means 
a comprehensive list. Yet all four contexts provide insights into current vectors of truth 
claims (Rabinow, Marcus et al., 2008) and how they contribute to modes of being-in-
the-world. 
Neuroscience: Enculturing Brains – Enbraining Cultures 
From feldnotes taken during a joint project involving anthropologists and computational 
neuroscientists in Berlin: 
It is one of these grey autumn days in Berlin. I am sitting in a laboratory-like room in 
front of a screen, wearing what can only be described as a wired bathing cap, a rubber 
thing with cables running from it, disappearing from my view. Te screen soon begins 
to show two faces that explain to me some kind of path or route I will later have to 
trace on a paper map. Rather than being positioned side by side on the screen, the two 
faces are superimposed onto each other and so is the audio track. My two experimenter 
colleagues, who are sitting next door watching me through a window pane, instruct 
me that it is my task to focus only on one of the faces and the voice that goes with that 
face. Luckily it is a male and a female face. Still, the task is amazingly difcult. I realise 
just how difcult it is when one of the experimenters tells me to relax, as my tense neck 
muscles are distorting the signal that we are after in this pilot for an experiment: my 
electroencephalogram (EEG), i.e. the electric currents produced by my brain-at-work 
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trying to master a particular task. Te point of this procedure is to fnd out whether 
my EEG (listener) relates to the face’s EEG (speaker) recorded earlier when narrating 
the story. Hypothesising that speaker and listener coordinate with each other during 
communication, can we detect that process of coordination using EEG? Te short 
answer is: Yes, we can. Te coordination of neural activity between two individuals is 
directly linked to verbally communicated information (Kuhlen, Allefeld et al., 2012). 
What is the point of being part of developing and running such an experiment from 
a phenomenographic perspective? Tere are four aspects to an answer to this question: 
1. Te neurosciences have been expanding at an extraordinary pace, particularly 
driven by developments in technology, method and analysis. Functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and related analyses are key elements of current research. 
Ambitious projects around the globe set out to decipher the way human brains 
function. ‘Watching the brain think’ is one of the slogans explaining this type of 
research in the popular press. Social and cultural neuroscience is a subfeld of these 
neurosciences. It is of interest to social and cultural anthropologists, because it 
considers humans to be animals that interact amongst each other in complex ways 
and that live in groups that share a set of key values, i.e. humans live in cultures 
and the fact that they do supposedly shapes their brain functionality in specifc 
ways – and is shaped by it, too.  Such truth claims about human group life are 
a matter of concern to anthropologists. Tey need to be examined critically to 
better understand the experimental systems, the genealogy of current concepts, 
the philosophical underpinnings of these concepts as well as the wider political 
economy of neuroscientifc research (cf. Callard and Margulies, 2011; Hasler, 2012; 
Roepstorf, 2013). Of particular interest to social and cultural anthropology are 
the notions of ‘the social’ and ‘culture’ that operate within current experimental 
systems. Both tend to be brain-centric. Tey position the brain at the centre of 
an autonomous individual self that engages in rule-based interaction with other 
autonomous individuals. Tese brain-centric individuals live in cultures understood 
as value systems. Much of this brain-centred reduction of the complexity of actual 
human group life and social interaction is driven by the methodological individualism 
built into current experimental systems through the fMRI machinery that really 
only allows the investigation of individual brains working in immobilised bodies. 
Most neuroscientists are very aware of the limited ecological validity of many of 
their assumptions. Tey are pragmatic reductionists (Beck and Niewöhner, 2006). 
Yet relational anthropology shares with Foucault the concern that neuroscientists 
do something that neuroscience itself might not be entirely aware of. Critically 
observing and analysing the discursive and practical consequences of neuroscientifc 
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modern society is an important element of relational anthropology.    
2. As the above experiment shows, relational anthropology attempts to produce a diferent 
kind of refexivity to that of critical deconstruction. It tries to develop experimental 
paradigms, the fndings of which act as a kind of reverse Widerstandsaviso within 
the neurosciences (Fleck, 1935/1979). Tey are meant to counteract dominant 
brain-centric and individualist thought constraints. Tree aspects are key: the role 
of the human body in coordinating social interaction (Beck, 2013a; Niewöhner 
and Beck, forthcoming), the social as an emergent phenomenon sui generis that 
enters into feedback loops with interacting individuals (Niewöhner, Kehl et al., 
2008), and the reassembled social that constitutes itself within specifc material 
environments and with the use of material artefacts and technology (Latour, 2005). 
Enculturing brains within patterns of material-semiotic practice, is an agenda that is 
critical towards much of the mainstream thinking in the neurosciences (Roepstorf, 
Niewöhner et al., 2010). Yet it is generative in its critique (Verran, 2013) trying to 
develop understandings of cognition as distributed and embodied that align better 
with current thinking in social and cultural anthropology. (Hutchins, 1995; Beck, 
2013a) 
3. To any social anthropologist sitting still in front of a screen watching superimposed 
faces certainly marks a very specifc form of ‘social’ interaction. Social neuroscience is 
a long way away from doing experiments in actual social situations, let alone within 
thick ethnographic contexts. It is not even clear whether they have any interest in 
getting there. Anthropology does not learn from the social neurosciences about the 
brain in social situations in a way that could be straightforwardly integrated into 
ethnographic analysis. Yet the experimental Widerstandsaviso works symmetrically. 
Experimental work with the neurosciences challenges anthropological theorising:
What is the role of perception, cognition and cooperation in human group life?
Can an advanced cognitive anthropology interact productively with social 
anthropology? Why is social theory so disembodied and a-material (Beck and 
Niewöhner, 2006)? Current new materialisms are beginning to address this, but 
few even attempt to work with the knowledge that is produced by the disciplines 
that know much more than ethnographers about the material world and the human 
body (Knappett and Malafouris, 2008; Timmermans and Haas, 2008, but see also, 
Dolphijn and Tuin, 2012; Lock, 2015; Niewöhner, 2015a). Relational anthropology 
in this context does not mean buying into experimental fndings and reifying 
complex and contingent socio-material phenomena. Rather it means thinking with 
experimental fndings and challenging the social and cultural reductionism built 
into social anthropological comfort zones.     
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4. In such an approach, the experiment is not only a natural scientifc method, but 
also an object of ethnographic study and a particular research aesthetic – one where 
materiality, technology and experimental systems are appreciated as good to think 
with (Roepstorf and Frith, 2012). Relational anthropology is thus an approach to 
social and cultural anthropology that collaborates with disciplines that do research 
about the human body and appreciates the productive confusions that emanate 
from it (Niewöhner, 2016). 
A phenomenographic perspective onto and with the neurosciences thus aims to 
rematerialise social and cultural theory as a way of inducing new refexivities into 
ethnographic research. It understands cognition as a distributed and embodied process 
inherent to shaping social interaction and inherently shaped by situated epistemic 
practices. 
Psychiatry: Ways of Knowing, Ways of Experiencing 
Our second facet of phenomenography takes us from controlled laboratory experiments 
with the brain into urban settings and psychiatric care. With partners from psychiatry, 
we have engaged in a collaborative research process over the last six years. Te initial 
aim of the project was to enquire into the ‘production of chronicity in mental health 
care and research’. How is the classifcation ‘chronically mentally ill’ used in everyday 
psychiatric and bureaucratic practices and what are the respective efects, specifcally for 
people classifed as such? At frst glance, the situations and phenomena we encountered 
during this research seem to be the very opposite of the ‘artifcial’ experimental situation 
described above. Conducting feldwork in mental hospitals and other institutional care 
settings and especially following patients outside the walls of institutions into their 
private lives meant dealing with unpredictable and often uncontrollable situations.
Yet the two felds both hybridise nature and culture in their own ways. Our collaborators
in the feld of psychiatry use the label ‘social’ to defne their position within (or rather on
the edge of) mainstream psychiatry. Te label ‘social psychiatry’ in the German medical
setting describes a critical stance towards increasingly biomedical explanations within
mental health research and treatment programmes. Put to the fore is an understanding 
of mental illness as systemic, comprising social relationships, environmental conditions 
and processes of adaption to a social milieu – with positive as well as negative 
consequences (Schmiedebach and Priebe, 2004; Dörner, 1995). Somatic mechanisms, 
specifcally brain functions and pathologies, are certainly not seen as the main target 
for therapeutic interventions. From their perspective, chronicity, i.e. the long-term 
persistence of a set of symptoms and experiences, is co-produced by a complex set of 
factors, including, frst and foremost, mental health care infrastructures, diagnostic and 
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treatment regimen with their labelling and looping efects and the challenges of urban 
living, including poverty and social exclusion. Being chronically mentally ill in a city 
is thus something that is not reducible to a brain dysfunction, but rather marks a very 
particular mode of being-in-the-world that is heavily shaped if not structured by medical 
knowledge, bureaucratic practices and requirements, and the entrainment of particular 
social routines within urban settings – a process we have elsewhere described as ‘niching’ 
(Bister, Klausner et al., 2016). At the same time, however, most social psychiatrists share 
the view that phenomena such as acute psychotic states contain corporeal elements, i.e. 
are materially anchored somehow. Teir particular form is not determined by or based 
on a material defect and it varies with treatment, social context etc. It might even be 
the case that psychosis is an entirely misleading category. Yet medication is routinely 
used to establish a situation where patients are able to enter into talk-based formats 
of interaction, showing that somatic interventions do have an efect and implying for 
most psychiatrists that psychiatric symptoms have corporeal components. For us, it 
is a phenomenographic question how the experience of being a psychiatric patient is 
situated within particular choreographies and wider infrastructures of care. (Klausner, 
2015; Klausner, Bister et al., 2015) 
Te particular social psychiatric perspective that we encountered is less grounded 
in universal standards, scientifc evidence and best practice guidelines. Instead, it is 
described and enacted within clinical contexts as a form of expertise that is gained 
by practical experience or enskilment (Ingold, 2000) and very much situated in local 
‘ecologies of expertise’ (Beck, 2015a) through practical engagement in social as well 
as environmental settings. Tis ‘experiential expertise’ was considered a key resource 
to meet the uncertainties of individual cases in clinical practice and to choreograph 
treatment trajectories with outmost fexibility. 
What is of interest here from a phenomenographic perspective is how this 
‘experiential expertise’ is legitimised and mobilised in mental health care, thereby 
producing specifc practical consequences. Rather than understanding these processes in 
terms of ‘medicalisation’, i.e. non-medical life-worlds coming under the jurisdiction of 
a medical regime, the phenomenographic perspective, in a frst step, diferentiates ways 
of knowing and pursues their grounding in specifc socio-material co(n)texts (Beck, 
1997). In a second step, it asks how certain ‘thought styles and habits order (new) forms 
of sociality’ (Beck, 2010) – how psychiatric expertise transforms the being-in-the-world 
of people living with a diagnosis. 
Experience in this context needs to be considered in two diferent ways. It not only 
serves as legitimation for the ‘doings and knowings’ of the social psychiatrist, but is 
also considered the core therapeutic object. A keyword in recently developed treatment 
programmes in social psychiatry is the notion of ‘expert-by-experience’: the patient 
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becoming an expert of his / her experience in the course of mental illness. Terefore, 
the patient is considered as a partner in the treatment process, centring on his / her 
individual illness experiences and his / her ‘coping skills’. Treatment in this sense is 
about a patient learning to transform the uncontrollable and wearying experience of 
mental problems into a conscious experience, which then becomes accessible to rational 
refection and skilful re-working. In the everyday therapeutic practices, this was pursued 
in a mode of collective inquiry (comprising the patient and the professional, as well as 
other patients, e.g. in group therapy sessions), where experiences were exchanged, probed 
and interpreted and thereby transformed into a more stable experience. Following the 
pragmatist John Dewey (1934), phenomenography problematises this process as the 
transformation of experience (in German: Erlebnis, as something someone lives through) 
into experience (in German: Erfahrung, as a refective moment of ‘closure’) (Beck 2015a). 
In this process, ‘having a psychiatric disorder’ is slowly being transformed from a process 
of labelling to a way of being a person (Hacking, 2006) and into a specifc way of being 
in the world. What at frst glance appeared to be an analysis of the inventory of clinical 
expertise was slowly turned into a more general investigation of ‘ways of experiencing’: 
how the experts’ know-how is legitimised as an experience-grounded and artful skill as 
opposed to simply a mechanistic application of diagnostic and therapeutic standards, 
and at the same time, how patients learn to express and refect their experiences and 
transform them into something meaningful. 
Experience from a phenomenographic perspective is thus never an authentic 
phenomenon that ethnographic work needs to pay particular attention to and even tries 
to empathically emulate. Rather ‘experience multiple’ is enacted as therapeutic tool and 
object carrying very specifc meanings of mental illness, of the pathological in general, 
understandings of what it means to be a good ‘patient’ and choreographing ways of 
being-in-the-world as a mental health patient. 
Two points follow from this: 
Firstly, experience must be analysed as practice, as experiencing, constituted 
by and in situations. We argue in favour of addressing ‘the interactive, ecological 
nature of experiences that are the outcome of a mutual, self-amplifying adaptation 
of actors and their natural, social, and cultural environments’ (Beck, 2015a, p. 20). 
Experiencing then is performed in the collective inquiry of patients and therapists, in 
concrete spatial arrangements and daily routines, drawing from historically evolved 
therapeutic concepts, hospital infrastructures and embedded norms of ‘good care’.
Tis dissecting of experience into diferent modes of knowing and being-in-the-world 
has at the same time fundamental consequences for an anthropological framing of 
experience which is commonly assumed as universal to human beings (cf. Desjarlais 
1994). Rather than taking ‘the subjective experience’ as the unit of analysis, the social 
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and material conditions and practicalities of experiencing move to the centre of 
phenomenographic analysis. 
Secondly, analysing ‘ways of experiencing’ substantially merges being, doing 
and knowing. While in a phenomenological approach the experiencing subject (in 
its relations with the world) tends to assume central position, a combination of an 
ecological-anthropological version of practice theory with the phenomenological 
interest in ‘being-in-the-world’ enables phenomenography to address ‘humankindness’ 
as a process and as an empirical problem. 
Reproductive Medicine: Techno-Science and Techno-Sociality 
Te partially connected ‘dividual’ is at the heart of much of current anthropology.
Tis becomes most obvious in the new kinship studies investigating the efects of 
reproductive technologies on kinship and social life more generally (e.g., Strathern, 
1992; Franklin, 1997; Edwards, Franklin et al., 1999). Within a series of projects, 
within which Stefan Beck was centrally involved (e.g., Beck, Cil et al., 2007; Knecht, 
Klotz et al., 2011; Knecht, Klotz et al., 2012), phenomenographic attention was turned 
to kinship as a classical domain of the social, as a form of social meshwork, as ‘difuse 
and enduring solidarity’ (Schneider, 1968) and as such a key element in ordering 
the social: What happens to everyday solidarities when something as self-evident as 
biological kinship becomes questioned? And how is this domain stabilised – normalised 
– once again, during and after repro-technological interventions? How does scientifc 
knowledge about genetics and reproductive technologies contribute to this? And how 
does one conceptualise a ‘techno-sociality’ were human life has literally been made on 
the lab-benches of a trans-nationalised medicine and where family life rests on notions 
of nature modelled on culture as practice (Rabinow, 1992)? 
A phenomenographic perspective approaches kinship as a set of practices (e.g., 
Franklin and McKinnon, 2001) or ‘structuring structure’ (Bourdieu, 1996), instead 
of a hidden grammar of society (e.g. Beck, Hess et al., 2007). It asks how patterns of 
‘doing kin’ emerge, sustain themselves, develop structural properties or, to the contrary, 
vanish again. It thus turns a topographic interest in mapping structural givens, into 
a topological interest for the concrete and situated workings of the multiple looping 
efects between everyday (family) life as lived, technology and expertise, and a diverse 
set of formal and informal institutions and regulations. 
Istanbul, Berlin and London harboured the feld sites within this series of projects 
conducted by Stefan Beck. Tey all foregrounded analytically an inherent mobility: of 
people, professionals, artefacts, and concepts navigating an increasingly thick palimpsest 
of knowledge, experience and regulation (Beck, 2007, 2012b). Take the Turkish branch 
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of the US-American Johns Hopkins hospital in Istanbul as an example, where Turkish 
doctors trained in the United States were treating patients from all over the world after 
strict US standards for clinical practice, within a physical environment completely 
imported from the US; or mobile patients, dodging the strict regulatory constraints of 
national bioethics, being treated by German-Turkish doctors migrating back to Istanbul 
after life and medical school in Germany. Such mobility can only be sustained through 
the fexible and often pragmatic use of religious, scientifc and regulatory concepts to 
make and stabilise familial solidarities after technologically assisted reproduction.  
Tis key role of mobility in co-producing particular practices of regulation and lived 
experience underlines an aspect of conceptual importance to phenomenography and 
relational anthropology more generally. It demands a re-conceptualisation of biopolitics 
in times of ever-intensifying transnationalisation and globalisation. How does one come 
to terms with biopolitical phenomena, such as standardised clinic equipment travelling 
around the world to “make life” in standardised ways in highly diferent places? Stefan 
Beck pointed out how Foucault developed his notion of biopower on the basis of the 
European welfare state. Today, however, the relationship between state and citizenry is 
constantly shifting and it is domains such as biomedicine and reproductive technology 
within which these shifts are negotiated. In fact, ethnographically following these highly 
mobile ‘patients’, it becomes clear that territorially bound nation states are today but 
one element acting on processes of social ordering. Patients navigate regulatory and 
epistemic landscapes heavily shaped by a globally operating capitalism and a thoroughly 
economised medicine, and they adhere to, reproduce and alter highly individualised 
sets of normative assumptions and rules, defying in practice any straightforward 
understanding of the nation state, populations or a body politic. While the critique 
of commodifcation always looms large in this feld of anthropological research, Beck 
was more interested in the meticulous ethnographic, or indeed phenomenographic, 
surveying of the degrees of freedom engendered by the co-constitutive shifts in regulatory, 
epistemic and experiential reproductive practices. 
Technology in Practice: Mediating Ways of Being-in-the-World 
Phenomenography is interested in better understanding how ways of being-in-
the-world are being done in practice. As the previous section has demonstrated, 
phenomenographic sensitivities are attuned to the practices of partially connected (in) 
dividuals. Technologies and their developmental hinterland play a key role in these 
practices. Here, phenomenography reveals its allegiances with science and technology 
studies, new (relational) materialism and feminist critique (Haraway, 1988; Barad, 1999; 
Law and Mol, 2002; Pickering, 2010; Beck, Niewöhner et al., 2012; Dolphijn and Tuin, 
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2012). Technology is never simply used or appropriated. Neither can it be sufciently 
understood as material object inscribed symbolically with culture. Technological agency 
is an inherent part of material-semiotic practices. 
In his last public lecture on digital practices in January 2015, Stefan Beck related the 
following fctitious story of his arrival by train that day to his audience: 
‘I got on the train to come here. To do this legally, I operated the application “touch 
and travel”’ via the touchscreen of my smartphone in order to buy a ticket. Hence, the 
program sent the data of my GPS tracking to a central server. To calculate my travel 
route, the means of transportation and the appropriate fare, my data were compared to 
the ideal timetable. Interestingly, the same was done with the GPS data of the train, but 
its data were compared to the ideal timetable in order to measure the train’s divergence. 
Via another interface I was able to recall the ‘delay’ live through another application of 
my phone. Tus, I could send a text message to apologise in advance: “I am at Hesse 
memorial [Hessendenkmal; a tram stop between railway station and lecture hall].” 
(Beck, 2015c) 
Tis simple example does not only show that everyday lives are always already 
technologically mediated. It tries to make the point just how deeply human practices are 
shaped by and embedded within digital infrastructures in often implicit ways. Practices 
are continuously being infrastructured (Niewöhner, 2015b). Trying to understand these 
digital infrastructures, research draws on yet further specialised technology; hence not 
only ways of travelling but also ways of knowing are technologically mediated. Instead 
of separating a ‘technological’ from a ‘social’ and trying to fnd meaning in matter 
between technological determinism and cultural pessimism, the relational and practice-
theoretical perspective asks ethnographically how routinised practices are mediated 
through technology over the course of time. How can habitus, body techniques or local 
biologies be conceptualised as practiced within specifc material environments including 
technological artefacts and their hinterland? Te ethnographer needs to carefully follow 
the web of signifcant infrastructural relations, which have been socio-technically 
constructed and in which people are suspended and enmeshed, thereby producing an 
analytical thickness that is ‘not localized in the way that either Geertz or Latour thinks 
it is’ (see also Rabinow, Marcus et al., 2008: 81; Beck, 2015a). 
Phenomenography extends this thinking to include analytical sensitivities towards 
the human body and to material environments writ large. Here, phenomenography 
difers from others in anthropology who have suggested that the analysis of technology 
ought to be integrated into a wider understanding of material culture – including 
particularly mundane, everyday objects – to avoid an unwarranted a priori analytical 
primacy of the material (e.g. Hahn, 2015). Te consistent focus on practices marks a 
somewhat diferent if perhaps complementary strategy to avoid such risks of fetishising 
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technology not through integration into the multitude of objects of the lifeworld, but 
through turning into an empirical question how relations of all kinds are forged through 
material-semiotic practices within specifc environments.  
In its most fundamental sense, this perspective also dissolves the implicitness of the 
corporeal and mindful human being as the inhabitant of an object-populated lifeworld. 
Te human self does not end with its skin, but is being conceptualised as a dynamic 
product of or even vector within material environments including infrastructures and 
mundane objects (Bentley, 1941; Bateson, 1972). Human beings are never autonomous 
users of objects within detached surroundings. Bateson was perhaps the anthropologist 
who most clearly articulated his difculties with attempts to distinguish a priori and 
categorically between self and environment without being able to observe how this 
division is produced. 
‘If you ask anybody about the localization and boundaries of the self, these confusions 
are immediately displayed. Or consider a blind man with a stick. Where does the blind 
man’s self begin? At the tip of the stick? At the handle of the stick? Or at some point 
halfway up the stick? Tese questions are nonsense, because the stick is a pathway along 
which diferences are transmitted under transformation, so that to draw a delimiting 
line across this pathway is to cut of a part of the systemic circuit which determines the 
blind man’s locomotion.’ (Bateson, 1972, p. 318) 
Te human self, as well as that self ’s experience as and knowledge and understanding 
of itself, is always constituted in socio-material environments and thus varies across 
situations: Human beings then are the efects of their substantial entanglements with 
their surrounding environments. Where cybernetic thinking conceptualised this 
entanglement systemically, Stefan Beck insisted on practice and process. In the lecture 
cited above, he continues, ‘I am diferently at Hesse memorial compared to Constable 
guard-house.’ Tis grammatically dubious statement reveals a diference in the process 
of ‘being’ that is induced initially by a diference in infrastructure. Picture yourself on 
this tram ride from the railway station to the lecture hall where you are meant to give 
a plenary lecture. As your phone tells you in real-time how you are being delayed and 
that you are unlikely to make it. Your mind-set and experience of that ride will change 
with every update of your travel app on your mobile phone. You may respond to this by 
sending a text message to the host or you may make a call. Te point is: the availability 
and operation of this infrastructure changes how you go about your day, how you 
experience a particular set of practices, but also how your body responds to a situation 
(stress, communication). Analysing this set of practices, it is not sufcient to operate 
with object, user and meaning. What about the afordances built into the travel app by 
software developers within their respective programming and marketing environments? 
What about the manifold looping efects between technology, body and self that may 
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bypass hermeneutic processes? What about the multiple ways of responding to this 
situation technically, socially and emotionally? What about the discursive, epistemic 
and political contexts of such situations? 
Phenomenography is about carefully attempting an answer to these questions 
– and returns us to the opening statement: studying humankind in all its aspects. 
Phenomenography certainly does not consider all aspects of human existence.
It provides an attempt to hybridise nature and culture in analyses of everyday practices by 
difracting analyses of doing human-technology relations through analyses of knowing 
and experiencing human-technology relations (compare Ihde, 1979). It extends practice 
theory into questions of experience without giving primacy to authenticity or reifying 
human subjectivity. And it extends phenomenology by dissolving the human subject/ 
self into a set of material-semiotic processes and relations; relations between body, 
technology and material/social/political/historical environment. Phenomenography 
thus contributes to a relational anthropology that asks how the human body, forms of 
subjectivity and ultimately humankind are constituted in practice and over time, and 
how these practices are shaped by knowledge and experience always conceptualised as 
relational phenomena. 
Conclusions 
We have provided brief insights into four research felds where phenomenographic 
attention creates a productive tension between practice theory and phenomenology, 
i.e. between doing and experiencing nature culture relations and their hybridisation. 
We conclude by insisting that phenomenography is a co-laborative research practice 
(Niewöhner, 2016) that engages in joint epistemic work with its research partners in 
the respective felds, e.g. social neuroscientists, psychiatrists, reproductive medicine 
practitioners or infrastructure and technology developers (see also Marcus, 2010). 
Co-laboration is necessitated by the degree and nature of expertise and institutionalised 
refexivity in these research felds. Phenomenography risks having little to add to the 
natives’ point of view unless engaging in jointly curating concepts that are good to think 
with (Rabinow, Marcus et al., 2008). Tis form of co-laboration, studying sideways 
(Boyer and Hannerz, 2006) or modest withnessing (Sørensen, 2009) tries to induce new 
forms of refexivity to anthropology and to the research felds by providing a protected 
space within which scholars can try other disciplines’ and felds’ ways of knowing and 
ways of being-in-the-world through scientifc method. It applies phenomenographic 
attention self-refexively to generatively irritate established thought styles and collectives 
and increase thought caprice. 
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